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Abstract
This paper investigates the eﬀectiveness of development strategies for tourism destinations.
We show that resource investments unambiguously increase tourism revenues and that increas-
ing the degree of tourism sophistication, that is increasing the variety of tourism related goods
and services, increases tourism activity and decreases the perceived quality of the destination’s
resource endowment, leading to an ambiguous eﬀect on tourism revenues. We disentangle these
two eﬀects and characterize situations where increasing the degree of tourism sophistication is a
viable development strategy and where it is impracticable without resource investment.
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mand; development strategy.
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11 Introduction
Considering the worldwide distribution of tourism activity we observe regions with highly developed
destinations and regions where tourism is still absent. Policy makers in these latter areas, which
include many developing countries, view the promotion of tourism activity, with its inherently strong
forward and backward linkages, as a leading growth and development strategy (see, for example,
UNCTAD, 2007; Lee and Chang, 2008, Sequeira and Nunes, 2008). This raises the policy issue of
identifying features that allow for a successful tourism take-oﬀ and of ﬁnding instruments apt to foster
the transformation of a region into a ﬂourishing tourism destination.
To address this question we investigate the characteristics of tourism demand and revenues in a des-
tination. In our model tourists are attracted by the presence of natural and/or cultural resources (see,
for example, Melian-Gonzalez and Garcia-Falcon, 2003, and Papatheodorou, 2003) and exhibit love of
variety preferences for tourism related goods and services, such as restaurants, recreational facilities
and so on. We show that overnight stays, which are a proxy for tourism activity, depend positively
on the degree of diﬀerentiation of tourism related goods. From the policy viewpoint this opens the
possibility of furthering tourism development, measured in terms of tourism revenues, by increasing
the variety of tourism related goods and services, that is, by increasing the degree of sophistication of
the tourism product.
We argue that while resource investments, that is, investments aimed at enriching the destination’s
resource endowments, unambiguously increase tourism revenues, increasing the degree of tourism so-
phistication has potentially an ambiguous eﬀect on tourism revenues. On the one hand tourism so-
phistication aﬀects revenues positively by increasing tourism activity (that is, overnight stays); on
the other hand it may aﬀect revenues negatively by decreasing tourism quality because of resource
congestion issues. We disentangle these two eﬀects and describe situations where the former eﬀect
dominates the latter one, so that increasing the degree of sophistication is a viable development strat-
egy and characterize the policy trade-oﬀ between sophistication and resource investments. We ﬁnd
that if tourism quality strongly reacts to tourism activity, then furthering the degree of sophistication
may reduce tourism revenues and that therefore sophistication as a development strategy may be con-
strained by the destination’s resource endowment. Our analysis suggests that for such destinations
tourism take-oﬀ may be unfeasible without resource investments.
In Section 2 we present the formal model and the main results. Section 3 contains some concluding
remarks and all proofs are listed in the Appendix.
22 The model
We consider a continuum of measure one of identical individuals, each endowed with a constant elastic-
ity of substitution (CES) utility function exhibiting Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) love of variety preferences
for diﬀerentiated tourism related goods. The utility function of the representative consumer j is

















where y is a composite non-touristic good1, h are overnight stays and xi, for i = 1; :::; n, represent
diﬀerentiated tourism related goods. We call T the tourism product, consisting of overnight stays (h)
and diﬀerentiated tourism related products (fxig
n
i=1), i.e. T = (h;fxig
n
i=1). z indicates the perceived
quality of the destination’s resource endowment, such as beaches, mountains, museums or more in
general heritages, on which tourism is based. We assume that at least one variety has to be oﬀered
such that tourism is viable, i.e. n  1; in other words, for n = 0, total overnight stays are nil.
n is the degree of tourism product diversiﬁcation and we consider it to be a proxy for the degree of
tourism sophistication2. We neglect for simplicity the index j wherever this does not lead to confusion.
Throughout the paper we assume the following.
Assumption 1 (i) 0 <  < 1, (ii)  1 <  < 0, (iii) 0 <  < 1.
Assumption 1 (i) implies that the non-touristic good y and the tourism product T are gross sub-
stitutes; for  ! 1 they are perfect substitutes. Assumption 1 (ii) implies that overnight stays and
tourism related products are gross complements, where for  !  1 they are perfect complements.
Assumption 1 (iii) implies that goods/services xi, i = 1,...,n, are gross substitutes.
The representative consumer faces the budget constraint
y + qphh + q
Xn
i=1
pixi = I (2)
where I is his income, ph is the price of a single overnight stay, pi the price of xi and q is the quality
premium of the tourism destination, that is, the premium related to the perceived quality of the
destination; the price of the non-touristic good y has been normalized to 1.
1y could also include tourism consumption related to other destinations.
2See also Andergassen and Candela (2009).
3We deﬁne  

1  2 (0;1),  

1  2 ( 1;0),   1 
 2 (0;1). We assume symmetry on
the supply side where pi = p and therefore in equilibrium xi = x, for i = 1,...,n. Let H =
 1
0 h(j)dj be
aggregate overnight stays, Xi =
 1
0 xi (j)dj aggregate consumption of each diﬀerentiated good/service
and Y =
 1
0 y (j)dj aggregate consumption of non-touristic goods.
We assume that tourism is based on natural and/or cultural resources and that an increase in
tourism activity reduces the perceived quality of the destination’s resource endowment (z) because of
congestion problems (i.e. common pool resources). Therefore, we conjecture that z depends negatively
on total overnight stays (H), which is a proxy for the size of the tourism activity, and positively on
the destination’s resource endowment (R). Variations in tourism activity and resource endowments
are likely to trigger price adjustments. We assume that the quality premium q depends negatively
on H and positively on R and that prices pH and pi, i = 1, ..., n, remain constant.3 Hence, price
adjustments triggered by quality changes are reﬂected in variations in the general price level q.
Assumption 2 (i) z = z (H;R), where zH < 0, zHH < 0, 0  limH!1z (H;R) < z (0;R) and
zR > 0; (ii) q = q (H;R), where q (0;R) > 0, qH  0, qHH < 0, @
@HHq  0, limH!1Hq = 1 and
qR > 0; (iii) zHR  0 and qHR  0; (iv)
q
z =  (H;R), where H  0 and R  0.
zH is the degree of quality depreciation as a consequence of tourism activity and part (i) states
that the depreciation becomes stronger the stronger tourism activity is. zR is the degree of quality
appreciation as a consequence of an increase in the destination’s resource endowment. Part (ii) implies
that through adjustments in the quality premium, prices adjust, at least partially, as quality changes.
 is therefore a proxy for the price-quality ratio, which remains either constant or increases as tourism
activity increases (part (iv)). This latter case captures situations where price decisions are decentralized
and non-coordinated4 and/or where an increase in tourism activity, i.e. overnight stays, leads to an
overall increase in production costs, while in the former case quality decreases are fully compensated by
a reduction in the overall price level of the tourism product. An increase in the destination’s resource
endowment does not lead to an increase in the price-quality ratio (part (iv)) and it reduces the degree
of quality depreciation due to tourism activity and the negative impact of tourism activity on the
quality premium (part (iii)).
3This follows from the symmetry assumption on the supply side, where ﬁrms in equilibrium set the same prices.
4Tourism decisions are often based on the average price level of a destination. If prices are set in an uncoordinated
way, the single ﬁrm has an incentive to reduces prices less in response to a reduction in the quality of the destination,








q(H;R) H  0 be the elasticity of z and q with respect to H,
respectively, where the former measures the degree of quality depreciation, and the latter captures the







H entails that the quality premium adjusts completely to quality changes, keeping the
price-quality ratio constant. Note that the assumption @
@HHq  0 implies that the absolute value
of the elasticity of q is lower than one, i.e.  "
q
H  1, implying that tourism operators have some
monopoly power5. This poses a limit to reductions in the quality premium (i.e. the overall price level)
as the quality decreases and may therefore lead to an increase in the price-quality ratio as tourism
activity increases (i.e. part (iv) of Assumption 2).
We characterize total tourism revenues as n and R vary. Tourism revenues are deﬁned as

(n;R) = q (phH + npX)
Since the representative consumer’s income I is constant and because of the aggregate budget con-
straint, characterizing 
 implies characterizing I   Y .
Proposition 1 Tourism revenues are increasing in R.
Increasing the destination’s resource endowment increases consumer expenditure for overnight stays
and for tourism related goods and services, thereby increasing tourism revenues.
Before characterizing the eﬀect of n on R we show that the aggregate demand of overnight stays
H? is an increasing function of the degree of tourism sophistication (n).
Lemma 1 H? is increasing in n; the larger j"z
Hj and/or the lower j"
q
Hj is, the lower @H
?
@n .
Because of the complementarity assumption between overnight stays and tourism related goods, an
increase in n increases overnight stays. Note that the stronger the reduction in the quality premium is,
the stronger the increase in overnight stays as n increases. The intuition for this result is the following.
Increasing n increases overnight stays and, because of resource congestion issues, the quality premium;
a reduction in the overall price level leads to more overnight stays. The greater j"z
Hj is, that is, the
greater the negative impact of tourism activity on its quality is, the lower the positive impact of an
increase in tourism sophistication on tourism activity.
We deﬁne M (n)  "z
H   "
q
H (1 + ).





are marginal costs, which requires 1 + "
q
H > 0.
5Lemma 2 Total tourism revenues are decreasing in the degree of tourism sophistication (n) if M (n) >
1, while they are increasing if M (n) < 1.
Tourism revenues are decreasing or increasing in the degree of product diversiﬁcation, depending
on the degree of complementarity between overnight stays and tourism goods/services (), on the
degree of resource depletion as tourism activity increases and on the degree of adjustment of the
overall price level (q). The result is driven by the interplay between two opposing forces: a love of
variety eﬀect which positively aﬀects tourism expenditures and a quality depreciation eﬀect, which
negatively aﬀects tourism revenues. If aggregate demand of tourism goods and the aggregate demand
for overnight stays are independent ( = 0), then n does not aﬀect H? and z. Consequently, only the
love of variety eﬀect is at work, which positively aﬀects tourism revenues. On the other hand, if they
are complements, then an increase in n leads to an increase in H? and to a reduction of the perceived
quality of tourism and to a reduction of the quality premium. Note that this eﬀect is stronger, the
stronger is the degree of complementarity and/or the larger is jzHj. The feedback mechanism through
price adjustments reinforces the negative eﬀect of n on 
. The reason for this result is that the
stronger price reductions are, the stronger the positive relationship between H? and n (see Lemma
1). Therefore, price adjustments, by increasing overnight stays and tourism activity, further reduce
tourism quality and revenues (
). Price adjustments are able to compensate quality depreciations only
if  "z
H  1; if this condition holds, then an increase in the degree of tourism sophistication always
leads to an increase in tourism revenues. On the other hand if  "z
H > 1, then price adjustments are
not able to keep the price-quality ratio constant. Suﬃcient condition for tourism revenues to decrease
as the degree of sophistication increases is that "z
H > 1. The stronger the degree of complementarity
() is, the stronger the increase in H? as a consequence of an increase in n. It follows that, if the
quality depreciation is strong enough, consumers increase their expenditure on non-touristic goods and
reduce their expenses on tourism. Note also that since H? is always increasing in n, it is nX? that is
decreasing in n for M (n) > 1.
Let us deﬁne  M  limn!1M (n):The following result holds.
Proposition 2 If  M > 1, then there exists a n where 
n ? 0 for each n 7 n, where n is increasing
in R, decreasing in j"z
Hj, j"
q
Hj and jj; if  M < 1 then 
n > 0 for each n.
If we consider n as a policy instrument for the development of a tourism destination, then n is
an upper limit for the eﬀectiveness of the instrument. The existence of n depends on the degree
6of resource depreciation; as stated in Proposition 2, a suﬃcient condition for the existence of n is
that limn!1"z
H > 1. Tourism sophistication leads to an increase in tourism activity (Lemma 1)
and therefore to a perceived quality depreciation of the destination’s resource endowment. Since the
quality depreciation gets the stronger the greater the degree of tourism sophistication (Assumption 2
(i)) is, it may happen that, as the process of tourism sophistication proceeds, the degree of quality
depreciation becomes suﬃciently strong such that a further increase in n leads to a reduction in tourism
revenues. In this case there exists a degree of tourism sophistication (n?) that, for a given resource
endowment, maximizes tourism revenues. Comparative statics result in the lemma show that the richer
the destination’s resource endowment is, the larger n is. In a similar vein, the less the resource is
subject to congestion, that is, the lower j"z
Hj is, the larger n is. n depends also on the strength of
the positive relationship between n and H: the larger jj and/or j"
q
Hj is, that is, the stronger the
eﬀect of a change in n on H is, the stronger the resource depletion as a consequence of an increase in
n and therefore the lower is n. On the other hand, if the degree of quality depreciation remains small
as tourism activity increases, then tourism sophistication always increases tourism revenues. We treat
the two cases in a uniﬁed way considering n < 1 if  M > 1 and n = 1 if  M < 1.
Corollary 1 Let MRSn;R   
R

n denote the marginal rate of substitution between n and R. MRSn;R
is negative for each n < n and is positive for each n > n.
As long as MRSn;R is negative, the policy maker can use both instruments to promote tourism
development and the optimal policy mix depends on the relative costs and beneﬁts of doing so. But
once n > n tourism development via sophistication is no longer viable unless resource investments
are undertaken. Note that if n = 1, then sophistication is always a viable development strategy.
For a given resource endowment, 
(n;R) is the maximum of revenues achievable through tourism
sophistication. If 
(n;R) is too low to guarantee tourism take-oﬀ, then resource endowments pose a
binding constraint to the development process and hence resource investments are necessary. Resource
investments have a direct positive eﬀect on revenues (see Lemma 2) and moreover they increase n
(see Proposition 2), paving the way for a further sophistication.
3 Conclusion
The main problem for policy makers of destinations is how to foster or how to kick-oﬀ the develop-
ment of a tourism industry. We investigated the eﬀectiveness of tourism sophistication and resource
7investments as development strategies. We showed that the success of fostering tourism development
through tourism sophistication may be constrained by the destination’s resource endowment. Tourism
sophistication increases tourism activity, thereby aﬀecting positively tourism revenues, but aggravat-
ing resource congestion issues. In particular, we argued that if the perceived quality depreciation of
the destination’s resource endowment as a consequence of tourism activity is strong enough, then en-
gaging in a sophistication strategy may well reduce tourism revenues, obstructing the kick-oﬀ of the
tourism industry. To overcome this hurdle, our analysis suggests that policy makers should engage in
investments aimed at enriching the destination’s natural and/or cultural resource endowment which
positively aﬀect tourism demand and revenues and lay the foundation for further tourism sophisti-
cation. Those regions where these investments are not feasible or too costly cannot become tourism
destinations.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We ﬁrst calculate individual demand functions, and then aggregate over individ-
uals. Since there is a continuum of consumers, each one has a negligible eﬀect on the perceived tourism
quality z. Using Lagrange for solving the problem of maximizing (1) under the budget constraint (2),










































































for i = 1;:::;n, where  is the Lagrange multiplier. Using the assumption that all ﬁrms producing
tourism related goods are symmetric we have pi = p and hence obtain xi = x, for each i = 1;:::;n.




























































































































Since all individuals are identical, h(j) = h and x(j) = x, and consequently H = h and Xi =
X = x. We calculate the aggregate demand function H (n;R), where the consumers’ choice H feeds
back into the perceived tourism quality z and the quality premium q. Using (8), we have to solve the
following ﬁxed point problem:





























which yields the solution H? = H (n;R). In view of Assumption 2, fH (n; (H;R))  0 and qH
increasing in H, with f (n; (0;R)) > 0 and limH!1qH = 1. Consequently, a unique H? solving




























































Using (9) and (10), one obtains that X (n;R) = x(n; (H?;R)) and Y (n;R) = y (n; (H?;R)).
Comparative statics results directly follow from (12).
Proof of Proposition 1. Since f (n; (H;R)) is increasing in R, it follows from (11) that qH is
increasing in R. Furthermore, from (6) it follows that if qH is increasing in R also qX increases as R
increases.
Proof of Lemma 2. From the aggregate budget constraint one obtains that 



















Taking the derivative of 
 with respect to n and using (12) we obtain, after rearranging terms,










































H (1 + )   1]
(14)
and therefore the result follows.




























which, under Assumption 2 is always positive. Moreover, since for n = 0, H? = 0 it follows that
M (0) < 1. Therefore, if  M > 1, then there exists a n such that M (n) < 1, or 
n > 0, for n < n,
and M (n) > 1, or 
n < 0, for n > n. On the other hand, if  M < 1, then 
n > 0 for all values of n.
10Finally, we derive comparative statics results for n. Consider ﬁrst the case of a variation in
R. Using the implicit function theorem one obtains that dn

dR =  MR




















(1 + ) < 0 in view of Assumption 2. We rewrite
M (n) as follows M (n) = j"z
Hjjj+ j"
q
Hj(1   jj). Since Mj"z
Hj > 0, Mj"
q
Hj > 0 and Mjj > 0,



















Proof of Corollary 1. The corollary is a direct consequence of Lemma 2, Proposition 1 and
Proposition 2.
References
[1] Andergassen, R. and G. Candela (2009). Less Developed Countries, Tourism Investments and
Local Economic Development. WP n. 676, Department of Economics, University of Bologna, 2009,
http://www2.dse.unibo.it/wp/676.pdf .
[2] Dixit, A. K., J. E. Stiglitz (1977). Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity.
American Economic Review, 67, 297-308.
[3] Lee, C.-C. and C.-P. Change (2008). Tourism Development and Economic Growth: A Closer Look
at Panels. Tourism Management, 29, 180 - 192.
[4] Melian-Gonzalez, A. and J. M. Garcia-Falcon (2003). Competitive Potential of Tourism in Desti-
nations. Annals of Tourism Research, 30, 720-740.
[5] Papatheodorou, A. (2003). Modelling tourism development: a synthetic approach. Tourism Eco-
nomics, 9 , 407 - 430.
[6] Sequeira, T. N. and P. M. Nunes (2008). Does Tourism Inﬂuence Economic Growth? A Dynamic
Panel Data Approach. Applied Economics, 40, 2431 - 2441.
[7] UNCTAD (2007). FDI in Tourism: The Development Dimension, United Nations, New York and
Geneva.
11Appendix: Proof not to be published
In this Appendix we provide some further details on the derivation of 


















The derivative of the denominator of 
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H, the derivative of 
 with respect to n
can be written as










































H (1 + )   1]
which is the expression reported in the proof of Lemma 2.
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